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Recent Developments

Kassama v. Magat:
Maryland Does Not Recognize a Child-Plaintiff's Tort Law Cause of
Action for "Wrongful Life"
By: Bryan Hughes
he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held the State of
Maryland does not recognize a childplaintiff's tort law cause of action for
"wrongful life." Kassama v. Magat,
368 Md. 113, 148, 792 A.2d 1102,
1123 (2002). The court further held
the trial judge did not err in submitting
the issue ofthe mother's contributory
negligence to the jury, or in refusing
her request for a "last clear chance"
jury instruction. Id. at 127-33, 792
A.2d at 1111-14.
Millicent Kassama (''Kassama'')
learned she was pregnant with !brion
Kassama ("Ibrion") in February,
1995. She was referred by her
primary care physician to respondent,
Aaron Magat ("Dr. Magat") for
obstetrical care. Dr. Magat first
examined Kassama on April 19 and
estimated that Ibrion was
approximately seventeen weeks, and
five days old. Noting she came to his
office late in her pregnancy, Dr. Magat
referred Kassama for standard
obstetrical laboratory testing the very
next day. These tests included an
alpha-fetaprotein test ("AFP test"),
which served as a screening device
for certain fetal disorders. Kassama
neglected to have the AFP test
performed until May 16. Dr. Magat
did not receive the results until May
25, when Kassama was twenty-two
weeks and four days pregnant. The
AFP test results indicated a
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significantly elevated risk that her child
had Down's Syndrome. Standard
medical procedure required the
mother to promptly undergo
amniocentesis to identify whether the
child had Down's Syndrome. The test
results, however, would not have been
available for two weeks, at which time
Kassama would have been over
twenty-four weeks pregnant and
unable to terminate the pregnancy in
Maryland.
!brion was born with Down's
Syndrome, and Kassama filed a
complaint in the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County on behalfofherself
and the child. Only Kassama's
negligence claim was submitted to the
jury, which found, in a special verdict,
Dr. Magatwas negligent and Kassama
was contributorily negligent Kassama
appealed to the Court of Special
Appeals ofMaryland, which affirmed
the trial court. The court of appeals
granted certiorari to consider
petitioner's claims that the trial judge
erred in giving a contributory
negligence jury instruction, in failing to
instruct the jury on the doctrine oflast
clear chance, and in dismissing
!brion's ''wrongful life" claim against
Dr. Magat.
The court first considered
Kassama's claim that Dr. Magat's
negligence precluded a finding ofany
negligence on her part, and
consequently, that the contributory

negligence instruction should not have
been given to the jury. Id. at 127-28,
792 A.2d at 1110-11. The court
found Kassama's argument rested on
the erroneous assumption that the jury
returned a specific finding of
negligence on the part ofboth parties,
when the jury's findings were general.
Id. at 129, 792 A.2d at 1111. The
jury did not specify what conduct by
Dr. Magat or Kassama it considered
negligent, and there were a number
of possibilities that would have
allowed a consistent finding of
primaI)' and contributory negligence.
Id. at 130-31, 792A.2d at 1112-13.
Further holding there was sufficient
evidence to warrant such an
instruction, the comt affirmed the trial
court. Id. at 131, 792 A.2d at 1113.
The court next examined
Kassama's contention that the trial
judge erred in denying her requested
jury instruction on the doctrine of
"last clear chance." Kassama, 368
Md. at 132, 792 A.2d at 1113
(2002). Kassama claimed even ifthe
jury could have found her
contributorily negligent, Magat still
had the last clear chance to avert the
injury "by advising her of the
abnormal result, to obtain
amniocentesis, and allow her to
terminate the pregnancy." Id. at 132,
792 A.2d at 1113. Again, the court
heldKassama'sargumentmistaken1y
depended on specific findings of
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negligence by the jury when its actual
findings were only general. Id. at 133,
792 A.2d at 1114. The court affinned
the decision of the court of special
appeals, finding "there was a
smorgasbord of possibilities [here]
and, as to most ofthem, the instruction
requested by petitioner was
inapplicable." Id. at 133, 792 A.2d
at 1114.
Finally, the court turned its
attention to the claim for "wrongful
life" brought on behalf ofIbrion. Id.
at 133, 792 A.2d at 1114. The
Arizona Supreme Court distinguished
''wrongful life" claims from other tort
law claims arising from the birth of a
child. Id. at 136, 792 A.2d at 1116

(citing Walker v. Pizano v. Mart,
790 P.2d 735 (Ariz. 1990)). These
claims were brought by children, not
parents, for alleged injuries caused by
children being born rather than
aborted. Kassama, 368 Md. at 136,
792 A.2d at 1116 (2002). Thus, in
the instant case, the injury claimed by
Ibrion was not caused by Dr. Magat,
but resulted from being allowed to live
"the injury oflife itself." Id. at 136,
792 A.2d at 1116.
The court recognized twentyeight states currently deny recovery
for these actions, while only three
provide for a limited recovery. Id. at
137-38,792 A.2d at 1116-17.
Among the first to address this issue
was the New Jersey Supreme Court
in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d
689 (N.J. 1967), holding such claims
required courts to measure the
difference between "life with defects
against the utter void of nonexistence," and that such a
determination "is impossible to make."
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Id. at 139, 792A.2d at 1117 (quoting
Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 692). The
vast majority of courts have been
unwilling to accept that impaired life
is worse than non-life, and have
rejected the "wrongful life" cause of
action on the ground that a child's life
cannot be a legally cognizable injury.
Id. at 141, 227 A.2d at 1119. Even
in the three states recognizing a
limited recovery for such claims,
recovery is limited to "the
extraordinary expenses ofdealing with
the impairment," and awards of
general damages are denied. Id. at
144, 792 A.2d at 1121 (2002).
Therefore, the court of appeals held
"for purposes oftort law, an impaired
life is not worse than non-life, and,
for that reason, life is not, and cannot
be, an injury." Kassama, 368 Md. at
148, 792 A.2d at 1123 (2002)
(emphasis in original).
In Kassama v. Magat, the
Court ofAppeals ofMaryland aligned
itself with the vast majority of states
refusing to recognize a child-plaintiff'S
cause ofaction for "wrongful life. " A
finding that an injury has occurred in
such a case requires a detennination
that non-life is preferable to living with
an impairment, such as Down's
Syndrome. While other jurisdictions
maintain such a detennination is
beyond the scope ofthe judiciary, the
court of appeals went a step further
by adopting an impaired life is not
worse than non-life. The court's
decision is likely to have far-reaching
implications on Maryland medical
malpractice litigation, as it precludes
a child-plaintiff from claiming a
number of possible causes of action
stemming from a doctor's negligence.

Life itselfcannot be a cognizable injury
in the State ofMaryland; thus, a cause
of action for ''wrongful life" does not

exist
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